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Introduction 
The Space Age may be divided into three general 
decades: 
The sixties, during which the initial steps of 
space exploration were undertaken. 
The seventies, when it can be anticipated that 
the successful explorations of the preceding 
decade will be developed into practical appli- 
cations. 
The eighties, when developed capabilities will 
be put to extensive use. 
The benefits to mankind are  beginning to appear 
in ever-increasing amounts ( Fig. 1) : 
During the sixties, these benefits generally 
took the form of space technology applied to 
uses on earth; e. g., materials, electronic 
components, computers. 
During the current decade, these benefits will 
increase to include systems operating from 
space; e. g., weather prediction, communica- 
tions. 
During the next decade, these benefits wil l  
further increase because of new applications 
(e. g., earth resources and navigation) and 
the ability to conduct more space operations 
( for  a fixed budget) through the reduced costs 
of both transportation and payloads arising 
from development of the Space Shuttle. 
This discussion will concentrate on Shuttle- 
induced benefits. 
Near-Earth Space. Space can be conveniently 
divided into three areas (Fig. 2): 
1. Escape, which includes the lunar and plane- 
tary areas; that area beyond the influence of the 
earth' s gravitational field. 
2. Synchronous is that altitude at which a satel- 
lite will remain above a fixed point on the earth. 
3. Near-eariin is a region baiow the imer Vu 
Allen belt ( N 500 n. mi.). This area is generally 
further limited to about 80 to  270 n. mi. , the former 
established by premature orbit decay, the latter by 
excessive performance requirements. 
Typical payload types and their relative status 
are also shown for each space area. 
Near-earth missions are  directly supported by 
the Shuttle. Operational areas for both the Space 
Shuttle and Tug are noted on the accompanying chart. 
Synchronous and escape missions require both a 
Shuttle and a Tug: the former to place the Tug and 
payload in near-earth orbit, the latter to transfer 
the payload to the final orbit. 
Space Miesion Characteristics. Figure 3 indi- 
cates the weight of payloads placed in near-earth 
( 80 to 270 n. mi.) orbit and into synchronous and 
escape orbits. For the latter payloads, an appropri- 
ate stage (Tug) is required for transfer from near- 
earth orbit to the final payload destination. Typical 
weights for this stage are also shown. When stage 
weight is added to that of the payload, an equivalent 
weight to near-earth orbit can be determined. These 
results are noted in the last graph and form the 
basis for the Space Shuttle payload requirements. 
The difference in Shuttle performance required for 
the two missions is accommodated by the variation 
in the launch azimuth required t o  support each mis- 
sion. Synchronous and escape missions are  general- 
ly launched in an easterly direction and are thereby 
aided by the earth' s rotation. 
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Thus, a Shuttle with the ability to launch 40 000- 
lb payloads, in support of near-earth missions, and 
65 000-lb payloads, in support of synchronous/escape 
missions, will have the capability to capture the fore- 
cast average of 30 near-earth and 20 synchronous/ 
escape missions per year. 
Current United States Space Launch Systems 
Inventory. The current U.S. inventory of space 
launch systems accommodates a wide range of pay- 
load weights to near-earth orbit, increasing (Fig. 4, 
from left to right) from about 300 lb for the Scout to 
about 250 000 lb for the Saturn V. With the continu- 
ing reduction in the number of payloads launched 
each year, maintaining this extensive inventory is 
becoming increasingly inefficient. 
Future Space Launch System Inventory. Devel- 
opment of the Space Shuttle in accordance with the ca- 
pabilities previously described would allow the U. S. 
space launch system inventory to consist of only the 
Scout vehicle and the Shuttle (Fig. 5). This inventory 
retains the capabilities of the current space launch 
system fleet and, in addition, affords the following 
desirable characteristics: 
Economic for both low and high launch rates 
New modes of operation, resulting in the 
potential for significant payload cost reduc- 
tions 
A high degree of standardization, leading to 
reduced costs for payload integration, flight 
operations, and personnel support. 
Mission Profile 
Significant elements of the Space Shuttle mission 
profile are  ground operations, launch, and staging of 
the two Shuttle vehicles (Fig. 6). 
After staging, the first stage (booster) returns 
to the launch area, while the second stage (orbiter) 
attains the prescribed insertion orbit after a series 
of orbital maneuvers. The orbiter then delivers and/ 
or retrieves its payload, enters the atmosphere, 
acquires the landing site, and completes the approach 
and landing. 
Safing operations are completed on each stage 
at the landing area, preparatory to the turnaround 
cycle ground operations. After payload installation 
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in the orbiter, the orbiter is mated with the booster, 
and the mated system is made operationally ready 
and transported to the launch area for a new 
mission. 
This sequence of events is described in more 
detail in the following pages, starting with servicing 
the vehicle in the Maintenance and Refurbishment 
( M&R) facility. 
Space Shuttle Vehicles in M&R Facility. The 
booster and orbiter are shown in Figure 7 during 
maintenance operations within the M&R facility, 
which provides a protected environment for perform- 
ing turnaround maintenance, premating, and erection 
tasks. M&R includes the area for mating and erect- 
ing the vehicles. Scheduled (time- or event- 
oriented) maintenance will be minimized, and 
airline-type condition monitoring techniques wil l  be 
maximized to provide the rapid, reliable turnaround 
cycle required by the Space Shuttle program. 
Erection, Checkout, and Preflight Handling 
Sequence. Upon completion of turnaround mainte- 
nance activities in the M& R area, the booster and 
orbiter are  ready for mating activities and subse- 
quent prelaunch activities. These activities account 
for approximately 70 percent of the ground turn- 
around elapsed time. Of this period, erecting, 
mating, transporting, and connection to the launch 
pad require approximately 80 percent of the time. 
Establishment of a minimum time interval of the 
vehicle on the launch pad is governed by: 
Rescue contingencies 
a Accomplishment of the high rate of operation- 
al launches with existing facilities. 
The vehicle and support equipment design (plus the 
planned sequence of operations) will contribute to 
the achievement of a minimum on-stand time for the 
vehicle. 
Vehicle Erection and Mating in the High Bay. 
Erection and mating operations are accomplished in 
the existing high-bay area of the Vertical Assembly 
Building: 
The booster is hoisted first, and installed on 
the mobile launcher with the upper surface of 
the booster facing away from the launcher 
umbilical tower. 
a The orbiter is then hoisted and placed on the 
upper surface of the booster. 
This orientation and sequence of operations will allow 
booster erection in advance of the orbiter and provide 
better clearance for the mating operation. These 
aspects promote flexible scheduling and rapid mating 
operations. 
Vehicle Transport to Launch Pad. The Space Shut- 
tle is mated on the mobile launcher, and moved to the 
launch pad on the existing crawler-transporter. The 
crawler-transporter engages the mobile launcher in 
the Vertical Assembly Building, moves the launcher 
to the launch pad, and then disengages from the 
launcher. The transport task will require approxi- 
mately 10 hours. 
This transportation method was selected after 
studying various other horizontal and vertical tech- 
niques. The selected method allows use of existing 
equipment that will support the turnaround require- 
ments and significantly reduce program cost. 
Terminal Countdown. A s  currently planned, the 
terminal countdown is a brief evaluation of the active 
functional paths required for the mission. The prime 
control wil l  be onboard, with ground personnel pro- 
viding expertise as may be required. A minimum 
number of monitor consoles and positions will  be 
used. These measures reflect a marked contrast to 
the large numbers of support personnel and long 
countdown times required for present manned launch 
vehicles. 
Board Personnel. It will be possible to enjoy 
ereat freedom of movement in the "shirtsleeve" en- .., 
vironment of the passenger/crew compartment. In 
this environment, bulky spacesuit equipment, with 
its complex connections, is eliminated. Because 
the c r e w  is not encumbered by this equipment, a 
rapid boarding ( o r  deboarding) process is possible 
with simplified closeup tasks. 
Mated Shuttle Vehicle at Liftoff. The Shuttle 
vehicle, with main engines ignited, is shown at about 
the time of liftoff from the pad in Figure 8. After 
liftoff, the vehicle will r ise vertically to a point ap- 
proximately 100 f t  above the launcher umbilical tower. 
At this point, first the roll then pitch programs will  
be initiated to achieve the desired trajectory. The 
guidance system will be an autonomous onboard 
system. 
Mated Shuttle Vehicle During Boost. Loads in- 
duced during mated flight will be reduced through the 
use of a load-relief flight control program. Under 
normal conditions, flight crew tasks a r e  of a moni- 
toring nature during this phase of flight. The mated 
Shuttle vehicle follows a preprogrammed flight path. 
Safe abort and landing are  possible, if required, 
during this phase of the flight. 
Space Shuttle at Staging. The booster and the 
orbiter are shown in Figure 9 at staging, with the 
orbiter continuing on its mission and the booster 
preparing to descend. The separation sequence is 
initiated by appropriate sensors monitoring booster 
propellant levels. To separate the vehicles, com- 
bined booster and orbiter thrust is employed through 
a mechanical leverage system. 
The orbiter will continue, under thrust, to its 
defined orbit, while the booster will initiate a turning 
descent for return to the launch base (Fig. 10). The 
booster will enter the atmosphere in an entry mode 
that will attain a maximum of 4 g for a short time. 
This concept of separation was  selected after 
a study of several methods, because it provides ex- 
cellent separation characteristics at normal staging, 
as well as  rapid separation any time during mated 
flight. 
Booster During Cruiseback to Launch Site. 
Following separation from the orbiter and atmos- 
pheric entry, the booster uses its airbreathing 
engines to cruise back to the launch site at an alti- 
tude of approximately 10 000 ft (Fig. 11).  Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) contact and control 
are  anticipated for the flyback operation. Takeoff 
and cruise capability also enables the booster to 
make normal cross-country ferry flights. 
Booster at Landing. The booster will return to 
the runway at  the launch site approximately 2 hours af- 
ter launch (Fig. 12). Landing is similar to that of 
a conventional jet aircraft. After landing rollout, 
the booster will taxi to the safing area. Selection 
of the launch site as the primary return site for the 
booster permits sharing facilities. 
Should an alternative landing site be required 
because of an abort or  to maximize performance 
capability, any conventional 10 000-ft runway, with 
standard landing aids, will serve as a landing site. 
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Booster in the Safing Area. 
runway area, the booster will be made safe for sub- 
sequent operations (Fig. 13).  Any residual main 
engine, power system, o r  attitude control propulsion 
system propellants and resulting evaporated gases 
will be drained and purged to a n  inert level so that 
turnaround maintenance can be accomplished in a 
nonrestricted, nonexplosive environment in the main- 
tenance building. 
After taxi from the 
Orbiter Unloading Payload at  Space Station. 
During this mission phase, the orbiter is the active 
element in transferring the payload. Orbit maneu- 
vering is provided by the orbiter maneuvering system. 
The orbiter cargo-handling and stabilization control 
will be easily accomplished. After the Space Station/ 
orbiter combination is configured and stabilized, 
cooperative procedures will be implemented for 
cargo .transfer activities (Fig. 14).  
Orbiter During Entry. Orbiter entry (Fig. 15) 
will be accomplished at a velocity significantly higher 
than that of the booster, thereby requiring a ther- 
mal protection system that will  survive extreme en- 
t ry  heating. Entry will normally be accomplished 
in the vicinity of the landing site which, for nominal 
conditions, will  be the launch site. 
The orbiter thermal protection system is designed 
to provide the capability for 1100 n. mi. of aero- 
dynamic crossrange. 
Orbiter at Landing. Landing characteristics of 
the orbiter are comparable to current high- 
performance aircraft (Fig. 16). Unlike the booster, 
the orbiter is capable of landing either with or  with- 
out airbreathing engines. Consequently, use of air- 
breathing engines wil l  be dictated by mission require- 
ments that, in turn, will depend upon payload weight, 
landing site, ferry requirements, etc. 
Upon completion of the landing phase, the orbiter 
undergoes a safing procedure similar to that conduct- 
ed upon the booster vehicle. 
Ca pabi I it ies 
Apportionment of stage sizes to the two-stage 
launch vehicles ( Fig. 17) permits satisfaction of a 
variety of missions in the most cost-effective manner. 
The ability to transport o r  retrieve a variety of 
orbital payloads affords the flexibility to support all 
anticipated space applications with the same basic 
launch vehicle ( Fig. 18). 
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The ability to provide service to payloads and/ 
o r  personnel on orbit extends the previously noted 
capability to the space environment (Fig. 19). 
Space rescue is one such extended capability ; anoth- 
e r  is economical Space Shuttle Station logistic 
resupply. 
System reusability (Fig. 20) affords both low 
recurring transportation costs and the ability to  
amortize Shuttle development costs within the opera- 
tional life of the program. Additional capabilities 
include: 
0 Development of earth-oriented equipment 
through sortie mode flights 
0 Reduction in losses due to abort o r  satellite 
failure 
0 On-orbit scientist participation. 
Cost Effectiveness 
Reducing the Cost of Space Operations. 
Space Shuttle has a design goal of reducing by an 
order of magnitude the cost of transporting payloads, 
both manned and unmanned, to low earth orbit. Even 
greater reductions a re  possible in placing satellites 
into synchronous and other high-energy orbits. 
These goals can be achieved with the Shuttle vehicle 
currently defined (Fig. 21).  
The 
Additional savings are also possible because of 
the manner in which the Shuttle operates. The intact 
abort capability (separate and safe recovery of both 
orbiter and booster after malfunction), for  example, 
provided by the Shuttle will further reduce the cost 
of payload losses because of launch vehicle failures 
will  no longer be experienced. Also, the ability to 
return payloads should reduce "infant mortality" 
losses to essentially the cost of a second Shuttle 
launch. Payload design may take further advantage 
of this ability to allow periodic refurbishment o r  
upgrading of failed o r  obsolescent payloads. 
The value of diagnostic study of prematurely 
failed space payloads should not only prevent recur- 
rence of such failures, but should afford the payload 
designer a better understanding of operational mar- 
gins of safety. Finally, the ability to guarantee 
placement of time-critical payloads has a significant 
but difficult to  quantify value. 
The benign environment of the Shuttle cargo bay 
(e. g. , low g-loads, an absence of shock loads induced 
by pyrotechnics, and the ability to continuously 
support the payload along its length) will result in 
substantial reductions in the cost of payload design, 
development, qualification, and production. Such 
features, coupled with relaxed payload weight and 
volume restrictions (for all but the most demanding 
payloads), should make it possible to design pay- 
loads in a more economic manner. 
The ability to perform experiments in space in 
an economic manner is yet another Shuttle-derived 
benefit. To date, many desirable experiments have 
been defined, but their implementation has been im- 
peded by the  high cost of transporting the payload to  
orbit, the cost of man-rating the launch vehicle for  
manned payloads, or the cost of fabricating the pay- 
load itself. In each area, the Shuttle offers signlfi- 
cant benefits. It requires no additional man-rating, 
since the orbiter element of the Shuttle may be used 
as the experiment base for periods up to 30 days. 
Thus, the need to develop a specific payload vehicle 
can, in many cases, be restricted to the development 
of experiment-peculiar instrumentation. Indeed, be- 
cause of the Shuttle environment and the availability, 
if desired, of supporting technicians on orbit, many 
space experiments may be conducted with laboratory- 
quality equipment rather than the more costly space- 
qualified equipment. 
Space Shuttle: Fundamental to Future Space 
Development Activities - I. 
the Shuttle is the keystone to future space develop- 
ment activities. In addition to  the payload implica- 
tions previously noted, the Space Station (Fig. a 
Space Tug (Fig. 23), and Research & Applications 
Modules (RAM) (Fig. 24) depend upon the Shuttle for 
transport to orbit, support while in orbit, and, when 
appropriate, return to earth. The ability to incorpo- 
rate these programs, in an orderly development, de- 
pends on the Space Shuttle. 
As currently conceived, 
In view of the sequential dependency of the other 
advanced space program elements, the Shuttle is, in 
effect, the only viable early program start. Indeed, 
much of current space program planning is predicated 
upon early development of the Space Shuttle; e. g., 
future Space Stations are based on extended orbital 
stay times for both technical and economic reasons, 
and such stay times are practical only with economic 
logistic resupply. 
Space Shuttle: Fundamental to Future Space 
From the frame of Development Activities - 11. 
reference of the Space Shuttle, there need be no de- 
pendent commitment to  develop any of these other 
systems; however, their development could be a 
natural follow-on to the basic Shuttle program. Ac- 
cordingly, it is at the discretion of the President and 
Congress when and if these activities are  initiated. 
But the ability to incorporate them into an orderly 
development is available so  long as the Shuttle vehi- 
cle is present. 
impact Upon Technological Superiority 
Current Space Program. Principal features of 
the current space program (Fig. 25) are,  briefly: 
1. A reduction in funding from the peak achieved 
i~ the late sixtie: 
2. An accelerating-reduction in employment 
featuring: 
a. Declining numbers of scientists/engi- 
neem employed 
b. Those who leave do not wish to return 
c. Rapid "aging" of engineers and scientists 
employed in the aerospace industry 
d. Declining numbers of engineers and 
scientists enrolled in universities 
e. Disenchantment of young people with 
technology and aerospace. 
3. Reduction in the annual launch rate and 
pounds of payload placed in orbit from the peak 
achieved in the late sixties 
4. Essentially, completion of technological ad- 
vances arising from the current space program. 
(Note, this does not mean complet'ion of such advan'c- 
es to new products and/or the "reduction to prac- 
tice" of such advances.) 
Without a reversal of these trends, the U. S. 
may be compromising its ability to meet future 
national goals. 
National Goals. A persuasive argument can be 
made that an early Space Shuttle contract go-ahead 
is a reasonable and prudent step that would contribute 
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significantly to attainment of those national goals 
that almost everyone considers to be fundamental to 
a healthy and vigorous national posture. 
As a democratic and dynamic society, we in the 
U. S. have many and changing national goals. Al- 
though there is wide disagreement as to relative pri- 
orities among the various national goals, almost 
everyone will agree that three are very high on any 
rational priority list ( Fig. 26) : 
1. Maintenance of National Security - Our na- 
tional security forces must have two basic character- 
istics: 
a. Quality essentially equal to, o r  superior 
to, the forces being countered. 
b. Timely deployment consistent with the 
attainment of substantial operational capability by 
the forces being countered. (Too little [ in quality] 
or  too late [ in deployment] is not acceptable. Main- 
tenance of national security is contingent upon the 
ability [not necessarily the act1 to deplay quickly 
quality weapon systems which, in turn, requires 
maintenance of a superior technological capability. ) 
2. Improvement of Economic Vitality - In a 
highly industrialized society, such as  ours, the cre- 
ation of new job opportunities is heavily dependent on 
the application of the fruits of a continuously expand- 
ing technological base to develop new products. Ex- 
panding technological capability is thus a prerequi- 
site to the creation of the job opportunities that are 
essential to maintaining and improving economic 
security. If the nation is to improve its economic 
vitality, it must maintain a favorable balance of trade 
in the face of increasing competition from nations with 
rapidly expanding industrial and technological capa- 
bilities. Over the long term, this can be achieved 
only if technological superiority is maintained. 
3. Enhancement of the "Quality of Life." 
Enhancement of the "Quality of Life." If we a re  
secure, and it our economy operates efficiently, the 
diversity of technological innovations that flow from 
maintenance of technological superiority will regular- 
ly continue to  enhance our quality of life. In advanc- 
ing the quality of life, our nation must cope with many 
problems, among them 
1. Providing opportunities for all citizens to 
obtain: 
a. Education consistent with their abilities 
b. Gainful employment 
c. Security from poverty 
d. High-quality medical care 
e. Recreational and cultural opportunities. 
2. Reduction in crime 
3. Control of environmental pollution 
4. Relief from the congestion and frustrations 
that plague both our urban communities and our 
urban commuters (Fig. 26). 
Expanding technological capability does not, in 
itself, ensure that these critical problems will be 
resolved. These problems can be resolved only by 
a combination of a national commitment to resolve 
them, coupled with the technological innovations 
required to resolve them, which can flow only from 
an expanding technological capability. 
Requirement for Technological Superiority. 
It seems plain that nourishment of our technological 
base to  ensure an expanding technological capability 
is essential to the achievement of such high-priority 
national goals as national security, improved eco- 
nomic vitality, and enhancement of our quality of 
life (Fig. 27). It follows, therefore, that commit- 
ment of resources to programs that focus around the 
sustenance and enrichment of our technological base 
is not, as  some argue, "Counter-productive to the 
new ranking of national priorities," but rather is 
mandatory if  the desired national goals a r e  to be 
attained. Thus, the maintenance of technological 
superiority should have high national priority, re- 
gardless of the current reevaluation of the rankings 
of natural goals. Technological superiority is a 
vital prerequisite to the attainment of almost all 
national goals. 
Elements of Technical Superiority. Technical 
superiority is achievable through the complex and 
interrelated working of four categories of activities 
(Fig. 27): 
1. Conducting exploratory research in the inter- 
est of advancing technical superioriw 
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2. Developing and "reducing to practice" state- 
of-the-art technology 
3. Improving and extending present technical 
skills 
4. Sharpening and refurbishing applied techni- 
cal tools. 
The end products of the beneficial coordination of 
these activities are the hardware, processess, tools, 
and skills that comprise "Technical Superiority. I t  
Maintenance of Technological Superiority. Main- 
taining technological superiority depends upon the 
continuing health of five distinct but related areas 
(Fig. 28): 
1. Basic research across a broad front 
2. Applied research in selected areas 
3. "New blood" in the form of young scientists 
and engineers 
4. Major, technically challenging development 
programs of national scope 
5. Multidisciplinary management/s cientific/ 
engineering/production teams that integrate and mo- 
tivate government, university, and industrial organi- 
zations. 
Justifications for the first two areas will  not be 
repeated here, since they are familiar and not direct- 
ly related to  a case for Space Shuttle. The latter 
three items are relevant and will be treated in some 
detail in the following pages. 
Availability of Engineers and Scientists for 
Future "Cutting Edge" Development Programs. One 
of the five elements essential to maintaining techno- 
logical superiority is the ability to continually attract 
"new blood" - young scientists and engineers - to 
the development programs that form the "cutting 
edge. 
ties for the attractions for young scientists and engi- 
neers to join active advanced development teams have 
vanished. As teams undergo forced reductions, a 
disproportionately high percentage of young engineers 
and scientists a re  among those laid off. 
In the current environment, both opportuni- 
This combination of essentially a zero inflow 
and a disproportionately high outflow of young engi- 
neers and scientists has resulted in the unfavorable 
trend that the average age of engineers and scien- 
tists employed in the aerospace industry is increas- 
ing by more than I year per calendar year. 
The lack of opportunity, coupled with the disen- 
chantment of young people with technology and, in 
particular, with the aerospace industry, has resulted 
in another unfavorable trend: reduction in science 
and engineering and enrollment in our colleges and 
universities, even as total enrollment continues to 
increase. Enrollment of full-time students in engi- 
neering schools, for instance, decreased by 9500 
during 1969 and 1970, and master's degree candidates 
have decreased by 18 percent since 1968. All signs 
indicate that the production of scientists and engi- 
neers in the Soviet Union is continuing to increase. 
A large proportion of scientists and engineers 
who have left the aerospace field has been irrevers- 
ibly lost. It has been our experience that the major- 
ity of such engineers will not consider rehire (even 
if offered large salary increases), because they seek 
more certain futures in stable fields that are free of 
political reevaluation. There is a sense of anxiety 
about working in a career area that is strongly im- 
pacted by public whim o r  by a new-found popular dis- 
favor with technology. 
Aerospace industry engineering and scientific 
employment has declined from a peak of 223 000 
in 1963, to  a current level of 175 000, and the slope 
is still depressingly steep downward. The projec- 
tions indicate that this trend will continue, although, 
at a slower rate, even if new national programs are 
initiated in the immediate future. 
The human resources that should be available 
to future integrated and multidisciplinary develop- 
ment teams are in jeopardy due to the five factors 
discussed briefly above (Fig. 29) : 
1. Declining number of engineers and scientists 
employed in the aerospace industry 
2. Surprisingly strong determination of those 
who have left, never to return 
3. Rapid "aging" of engineers and scientists 
employed in the aerospace industry 
4. Declining enrollment of science and engineer- 
ing students 
5. Disenchnatment of young people with technol- 
ogy - particularly with the aerospace industry. 
As a result, the nation may lack the human re- 
sources required to  maintain our technological level 
in the seventies, and may find itself irreparably be- 
hind the power curve in the decade of the eighties. 
Implementation of a single major program develop- 
ment wil l  not, by itself, correct this bleak situation, 
but inauguration of the Shuttle will  be a step in the 
right direction. 
Major Programs as the "Cutting Edge" of Tech- 
noloHcal Advancement. New programs that serve as 
the foci that forge the "cutting edge" a re  now urgently 
required to replace the Intercontinental Ballistic Mis- 
sile (ICBM) and the Apollo programs. It will not be 
as easy to rally congressional and public support for 
new programs in the current environment. The direct 
goals of a program, such as Space Shuttle, will not be 
as apparent or considered as critical as were those of 
the ICBM or Apollo. The indirect benefits - serving 
as  the "cutting edge, which a re  equally important, 
indeed, critical to the maintenance of national tech- 
nological capability - are not generally appreciated 
or well understood by the American public. Although 
the difficulties in advocating such programs are today 
more severe, the critical necessity for such "cutting 
edge" programs that permit the momentum of tech- 
nological advance to continue is no less real. 
It is essential that Congress and the public be af- 
forded a better understanding of three aspects of 
technology (Fig. 30): 
1. The role of technology as  the progenitor of 
major programs 
2. The long lead times required to reach the 
technical "payoff' 
3. The difficulties involved in distributing the 
resources required to balancc thc tcchnical effort. 
Integrating Influence of "Cutting Edge" Programs. 
Characteristically, our nation has had a high degree 
of success in bringing together the howledge (gath- 
ered from basic research and applied research) and 
the people (scientific, engineering, and technical 
personnel organized in multidisciplinary teams) to 
improve our technical and economic capability; these 
resources have been applied in a major program to- 
ward the end of obtaining a new, better, o r  less  
expensive product. But important byproducts of 
these efforts have been: 
1. Stimulation of new concepts 
2. Advances made in technology - the state of 
the art 
3. Translation of scientific information into 
engineering and technical skills 
4. Sharpening and refurbishing operating tools, 
skills, and processes ( Fig. 31) .  
Major "Cutting Edge" Programs. In our gener- 
ation, the U. S. has made a dramatic advance in its 
technological capability. The momentum of this 
advance has depended upon the "cutting edge" pro- 
vided by major national programs that focused ad- 
vanced management, scientific, engineering, and 
production talents on achieving specific capabilities 
at specified times (Fig. 32) .  
In World W a r  11, for example, high-performance 
aircraft, radar, the atomic bomb, and other specific 
weapon systems served as the foci and provided the 
catalyst for a surge in technological capabilities. 
These programs were readily supported by Congress 
and the American public, not because they advanced 
technological capabilities, but because they were 
considered essential to prosecuting the war effort 
and, therefore, essential to national survival. 
In the cold war period, the hydrogen bomb, 
ICBM, and nuclear submarine programs served as 
similar foci and forged the "cutting edge" of continu- 
ing growth in technological capability. These pro- 
grams were also readily supported by Congress and 
the American people. Again, not because they 
forged the cutting edge, but because they were con- 
sidered essential to national defense. 
Later, the response to Sputnik, culminating in 
the Apollo program, increased our awareness of the 
need to sharpen the "cutting edge" and ensured the 
momentum that maintained our technological superi- 
ority. This effort was  also readily supported by the 
Congress and the American public as  a result of the 
shock of Sputnik and the call of President Kennedy to 
a great adventure: ''to be the f i rs t  people to walk on 
the moon. 
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Thus, during our generation, major cutting-edge 
programs have found support - but thk massive 
support has been forthcoming for reasons other than 
the assurance of national technological leadership. 
Required Program Features. The required pro- 
gram features enumerated in Figure 33 serve as a 
checklist to test the suitability of candidate programs. 
Briefly, these features are: 
1. Technology advance to support "technical 
superiority" through the interrelated working of the 
four noted activities 
2. Capability of a near-term program star t  
3. Maintenance of and, perhaps, modest increase 
in engineering work force 
4. Ability to achieve a reasonable rate of return 
through implementation of a major program that can 
serve as  the "cutting edge" that permits the momen- 
tum of technological advance to continue 
5. Ability, if desired, to expand to other pro- 
grams in a controlled and predefinable manner 
6. Ability, if desired, to stretch program devel- 
opment in an efficient manner to conform to currently 
unforeseen funding limitations 
7. Ability to include international participation in 
an orderly and mutually satisfactory manner. 
Required Results of New "Cutting Edge" Programs. 
"Cutting edge" programs must be of a magnitude 
(in terms of resources committed), urgency, and 
level of technical difficulty that the Nation wil l  recog- 
nize the critical contribution that the program will  
make and wil l  be steadfast in giving the program its 
support. The salient requirements of such a pro- 
gram are  noted in Figure 34. 
Space Shuttle: Impact on National Technical 
Superiority. Space Shuttle can and should serve as 
the keystone of our future national space program. 
This belief is  based on Shuttle' s ability to serve as  
the keystone for future space development activities, 
The Space Shuttle program is well suited to re- 
place Apollo as the sharp "cutting edge" required 
to maintain national technological superiority. It 
will serve as a focus of and catalyst for advanced 
technology efforts in a variety of fields that have 
tremendous economic potential; e. g. , high- 
temperature materials, lightweight structures, 
automatic checkout for complex systems, and hyper- 
sonic aerodynamics. 
In addition, operational capabilities of the devel- 
oped system will: (1) greatly increase our flexi- 
bility to perform space operations, (2)  increase 
our opportunities to apply space systems to the 
direct benefit of man, and (3)  greatly improve the 
economics of space operations. 
In summary, the Space Shuttle program is ready 
to enter the development phase, will result in opera- 
tional capabilities of great direct benefit to the na- 
tion, and, more important, can serve as  the "cutting 
edge" of expanding technological capability. With- 
out a near-term star t  uf a major program, such as  
the Space Shuttle, the "cutting edge" that was keen 
during the Apollo development program will continue 
to grow dull, and soon, with a deceleration of tech- 
nological advance, the Nation will  lose i ts  technologi- 
cal superiority. 
Impact Upon National Economics 
Comparative Impact of Three Environment 
Programs. A Space Shuttle program will  generate 
a higher level of indirect purchases (and therefore 
total purchases) than would an equivalent outlay for 
consumer spending, and a significantly higher level 
of indirect purchases than would the same dollar 
outlay for a residential housing construction pro- 
gram (Fig. 36). The total direct purchases attribut- 
able to each of the three programs were aggregated 
into eight industry graups. Two significant points 
are conveyed by these data: 
1. The impact of the Space Shuttle wil l  pervade 
the total economy into each industry group. 
2. The Space Shuttle is the only alternative 
considered that will stimulate the aerospace industry, 
where there, currently, is a very high level of un- 
employment among highly skilled workers, scientists, 
and engineers. 
Thus, of the three programs compared, the 
greatest impact, from the standpoint of total produc- 
tion, would result from the Shuttle program. 
It is interesting to note that high-technology in- 
dustries are the areas primarily affected by the 
Shuttle program, whereas relatively low-technology 
industries are primarily impacted by the other pro- 
grams. From this, one can discern that solutions 
to the high unemployment problem found among 
highly trained engineers, scientists, and skilled 
technicians would most likely be found in the Shuttle 
program. 
The Space Shuttle program would also tend to 
favorably impact the U. S. balance-of-trade problem, 
since the program would require fewer imports than 
would be required for residential housing construc- 
tion o r  consumer spending. Perhaps of equal signifi- 
cance is the fact that since the Shuttle program would 
stimulate high technology industries, it would ipso 
facto provide a greater stimulus to high-technology 
exports. This i s  of vital importance since the U. S. 
depends on high-technology export to maintain a 
favorable balance of trade. It is also important to 
note that, based on each industry's ratio of exports 
to total 1970 production, the Shuttle program would 
induce three times more total exports than the other 
two programs. 
National Economic Benefits of Space Shuttle 
Program. In summary, the Space Shuttle program 
would have a favorable impact upon the U. S. economy 
in the following ways (Fig. 37) : 
1. The approximately $ 9 . 5  billion cost to the 
U. S. Government would stimulate about $ 20 billion 
of domestic production. 
2. Many jobs would be created: more than 
400 000 man-years in the aerospace industry and more 
than 280 000 man-years in nonaerospace industries. 
The current unemployment problem in the aerospace 
industry would be partially alleviated. 
3. The U. S. balance-of-trade picture would be 
improved. Space Shuttle would require fewer im- 
ports than would a residential housing construction 
program o r  increased consumer spending of com- 
parable size. Also, based upon the historical ratios 
of exports to total domestic production, the Space 
Shuttle program would induce more total exports 
than the other programs examined. More important, 
the Shuttle will simulate those high-technology in- 
dustries that have been the most significant source 
of U. S. exports in recent years. 
Conch sion 
The Space Shuttle program, as  currently defined, 
will: 
0 Satisfy national space transportation 
requirements at reduced costs 
0 Permit additional savings to be made to 
payload development and operation costs 
which, in turn, will  
0 Provide requisite "cutting edge" program for  
maintaining technical superiority 
0 Favorably impact national economy through 
increased employment. Production and bal- 
ance of trade 
0 Expand practical space applications for man- 
kind' s benefit 
and 
0 Support national goals. 
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Figure 2. Space regions and operations for the Space Shuttle and Space Tug. 
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Figure 3. Weight of payloads at various orbits. 
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Figure 4. Current U. S. inventory of space launch systems. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the Scout and Space Shuttle. 
Figure 6. Mission profile. 
Figure 7. Booster and orbiter in M&R facility. 
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Figure 8. The Shuttle vehicle at liftoff. 
Figure 9. Booster and orbiter at separation stage. 
Figure 10. Completed separation of booster and orbiter. 
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Figure 11. Booster during cruiseback to launch site. Figure 12. Booster at landing. 
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Figure 13. Booster in safing area. Figure 14. Orbiter unloading payload at Space Station. 
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Figure 15. Orbiter during entry. 
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Figure 17. Two-stage launch vehicle. 
Figure 16. Orbiter a t  landing. 
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Figure 18. Transports to or retrieves from orbit. 
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Figure 19. Services payloads and/or men on orbit. Figure 20. Reusable. 
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Figure 21. Cost reduction of space operations. 
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Figure 22. Space Station. 
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Figure 23. Space Tug. 
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Figure 24. Research and Applications Modules (RAM). 
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Figure 25. Impact upon technological superiority. 
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Figure 26. National goals. 
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Figure 27. Requirements and elements of technological superiority. 
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Figure 28. Maintenance of technological superiority. 
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Figure 29. Current trends in availability of scientists and engineers. 
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Figure 30. Three aspects of technology serving as  the "cutting edge. 
I BASIC RESEARCH OBTAl N NEW BETTER & LESS EXPENSfVE PRODUCTS 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMS 
STIMULATE NEW CONCEPTS ' 
ADVANCE STATE OF THE ART 
*TRANSLATE SCIENCE INTO 
SHARPEN OPERATING TOOLS 
NEW SCI.lTECH. BLOOD 
ENGINEERING SKI LLS 
Figure 31. Integrating influence of "Cutting Edge" programs. 
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Figure 32. Major "Cutting Edge" programs. 
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Figure 33. Required programs features. 
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Figure 34. Required results of new "Cutting Edge" program. 
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Figure 35. Space Shuttle as  keystone to future space operations. 
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Figure 36. Comparative impact of three environment programs. 
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